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Substance over Form
CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.1 should have ended the long struggle by lower
courts throughout the United States to determine whether
corporations are subject to civil liability under the Alien Tort
Statute (the ATS).2 The ATS provides U.S. courts with
jurisdiction to hear civil cases brought by foreign plaintiffs for
violations of “the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”3 Litigants often used the law to file claims in the U.S.
against multinational corporations for allegedly aiding and
abetting foreign governments in the commission of human
rights violations,4 such as “genocide, extrajudicial killing,
torture, crimes against humanity, sexual violence, and
kidnap[p]ing.”5 In this regard, the ATS was a powerful tool.
Courts, however, have inconsistently interpreted the
scope of the ATS. In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit became the
first federal appellate court to expressly articulate a basis for
corporate liability under the ATS,6 and district courts
throughout the country had already generally reached the
same conclusion.7 But in the landmark 2010 decision, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit held that “the
law of nations” does not recognize civil liability of corporations
1

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148-49 (2d Cir.), reh’g
denied 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 2326271 (June 6, 2011) (No. 10-1491), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491), 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2
See infra Parts III and IV.
3
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS is also referred to as the Alien Tort
Claims Act or the ATCA.
4
See infra Parts III and IV.
5
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
6
See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
7
Mara Theophila, Note, “Moral Monsters” Under the Bed: Holding
Corporations Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Corp., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2881-82 (2011).
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for human rights violations; therefore, plaintiffs are unable to
bring ATS claims against corporations in U.S. courts.8 Although
Kiobel significantly limited the scope of the ATS, other federal
appellate courts subsequently issued contrary opinions,
thereby maintaining the ATS as a potential path for civil
liability claims against corporations. For example, in 2011, the
D.C. Circuit held in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. that the ATS
permits civil liability against corporations.9 Just three days
after that decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co., reached a similar conclusion.10 Shortly
thereafter, the Ninth Circuit similarly found in favor of
corporate liability under the ATS in Sarei v. Rio Tinto.11 With
Kiobel creating a Circuit split, the rulings in Exxon, Flomo, and
Rio Tinto made the Second Circuit an outlier.
However, given its prominent role in the history of ATS
litigation, the Second Circuit’s ruling was significant and
necessitated review by the Supreme Court.12 In June 2011, the
Kiobel respondents filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,13 which
the Court granted in October 2011.14 During the first round of oral
argument, which addressed “whether corporations could be sued
under [the ATS]”,15 the justices expressed concern about the lack of
a U.S. nexus.16 In Kiobel, Nigerian plaintiffs brought suit against
defendant corporations, incorporated in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, for alleged human rights violations that occurred
in Nigeria. During arguments, Justice Alito asked, “What business
does a case like that have in the courts of the United States?”17 In
March 2012, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to file
supplemental briefs on the extraterritorial application of the ATS;
something that had not been considered by the courts below.18 The
Supreme Court specifically requested further guidance on “whether
8

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148-49 (2d Cir.), reh’g
en banc denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir.), reh’g denied , 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2010),
petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 2326271 (June 6, 2011) (No. 10-1491), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491), 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
9
Exxon Mobile, 654 F.3d at 15;
10
See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011).
11
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736, 747-48, 764 (9th Cir. 2011).
12
See infra Parts I.B and IV.
13
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel, 2011 WL 2326271 (No. 10-1491).
14
See Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
15
Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Orders Reargument in Alien Tort Statute
Case, BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/
2012/03/supreme-court-orders-reargument-in-alien-tort-statute-case.html.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows [U.S.] courts to
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations
occurring” outside the United States.19
The Court heard argument on the issue of
extraterritoriality on the first day of the October 2012 term.20
The Court contended with fifty supplemental amicus briefs
filed on the issue;21 an amount that, when compared to the
thirty-six amicus briefs filed on the issue of corporate liability,
indicated the close attention paid to this facet of the case.22 On
April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a much anticipated
and long-awaited opinion. The Court unanimously upheld the
Second Circuit ruling and denied the Nigerian petitioners
access to U.S. federal courts under the ATS. Surprisingly,23 the
Court based its decision on the presumption against the
exterritorial application of statutes and did not address
whether corporate liability is permitted under the ATS.24
Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel severely
restricts the applicability of the ATS to human rights violations
committed abroad, the question of corporate liability under the
ATS remains unanswered. This note argues that if and when
lawsuits falling within the newly defined limits of the ATS are
brought against corporations, U.S. courts should hold them
accountable. In particular, this note finds that the courts
adhering to the Kiobel line of jurisprudence mistakenly focus
on the form of the perpetrator committing the human rights
violations rather than the substance of the abuse. This results
in a misinterpretation of international law, one that exempts
corporations from civil liability under the ATS.

19

Louis M. Solomon, Extraterritoriality Becomes Focus of Kiobel Supreme Court;
Are We Headed for Morrison II?, CADWALADER INT’L PRAC. LAW BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://blog.internationalpractice.org/international-practice/extraterrritoriality-becomesfocus-of-kiobel-supreme-court-are-we-headed-for-morrison-ii.html.
20
John Bellinger, Kiobel: Supplemental Briefs on Extraterritoriality Are In . . .,
LAWFARE (Aug. 14, 2012, 10:52 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/kiobelsupplemental-briefs-on-extraterritoriality-are-in/.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Stephanie Safdi, Corporate Accountability for Human Rights: Kiobel’s Call to
Action, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:12 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
stephanie-safdi/kiobel-human-rights_b_3111575.html (“What is particularly striking about
yesterday’s decision is that the question of extraterritorial applicability was never even an
issue in the lower courts.”).
24
Kristin Linsley Myles, Kiobel Commentary: Answers . . . and More Questions,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentarykiobel-answers-and-more-questions/.
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This note is divided into five parts. Part I focuses on the
foundations of the ATS: the context in which the ATS was
passed, the birth of ATS litigation, and an introduction to the
law of nations. Part II highlights the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sosa, which shaped the modern framework of ATS lawsuits. This
modern framework, however, has been inconsistently applied and
Part III illustrates the need for further jurisprudential guidance.
Part IV summarizes the line of jurisprudence espoused in Exxon,
Flomo and Rio Tinto to demonstrate that the Second Circuit
wrongly decided Kiobel. Lastly, Part V synthesizes and analyzes
the various arguments made throughout the history of ATS
litigation. This Part argues that the ATS supports claims of
corporate liability and, derivatively, that the U.S. judiciary can
be a forum that offers protection from human rights abuses.
I.

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

Pursuant to the ATS, “district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”25 Thus, absent an alleged treaty violation, a
plaintiff must allege a violation of the law of nations to invoke
jurisdiction under the ATS.26 An understanding of “the law of
nations” reveals the statute’s reach.
A.

The Law of Nations

In Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court established a
framework to determine what constitutes the “law of nations,”
explaining: “[i]nternational law is part of our law,
and . . . where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .”27 Of course, even
with this working definition, determining “what offenses
violate customary international law . . . is no simple task.”28 The
Second Circuit has explained:
Customary international law is discerned from myriad decisions
made in numerous and varied international and domestic arenas.
25

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (“In sum, we think
the statute was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the
courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject.”).
27
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
28
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003).
26
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Furthermore, the relevant evidence of customary international law
is widely dispersed and generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges.
These difficulties are compounded by the fact that customary
international law—as the term itself implies—is created by the
general customs and practices of nations and therefore does not stem
from any single, definitive, readily-identifiable source. All of these
characteristics give the body of customary international law a “soft,
indeterminate character . . . .”29

At the time the ATS was enacted, “the principal violations of
customary international law were ‘piracy, mistreatment of
ambassadors, and violation of safe conducts.’”30 Today, the law
of nations is also violated by genocide, slavery, torture,
prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic discrimination
on the basis of race.31
The law of nations, while often lauded for its humanitarian
objectives, also raises concerns. Judge Posner explained:
The concept of customary international law is disquieting in two
respects. First, there is a problem of notice: a custom cannot be
identified with the same confidence as a provision in a legally
authoritative text, such as a statute or a treaty. (Modern common
law doesn’t present that problem; it is a body of judge-created
doctrine, not of amorphous custom.) Second, there is a problem of
legitimacy—and for democratic countries it is a problem of
democratic legitimacy. Customary international legal duties are
imposed by the international community (ideally, though rarely—
given the diversity of the world’s 194 nations—by consensus), rather
than by laws promulgated by the obligee’s local community.32

It is important to take these concerns into account when
determining the appropriate scope of the ATS.
B.

Historical Context of the ATS

The First Congress of the United States passed the ATS
“as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.”33 There is little surviving
legislative history regarding the ATS; it is generally believed,
however, that the law was intended to assure foreign
governments that the United States “would not tolerate flagrant
violations of the ‘law of nations,’” especially breaches concerning
29

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 29 (1995)).
30
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011).
31
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987).
32
Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1016.
33
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 3 (2003).
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diplomats and merchants.34 Records indicate that “two incidents of
assault against foreign ambassadors on U.S. soil” motivated the
United States, a burgeoning country at the time, “to display
American leadership in defending international standards of good
behavior.” 35 Recognizing the important role of the judiciary in
foreign affairs, the First Congress promulgated the Judiciary Act
of 1789 in order “to provide a federal forum to discharge the duty
of the nation, to avoid potentially hostile state courts, and to
promote uniform interpretation when dealing with violations of
the law of nations.”36
The ATS remained “dormant” for nearly 200 years37
until 1978, when Filartiga v. Pena-Irala38 “ushered in the
modern era of ATS litigation.”39 In Filartiga, the Second Circuit
relied on ATS-based jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of two
Paraguayan nationals against a former Paraguayan government
official for alleged acts of torture and murder in violation of
international law.40 In essence, Filartiga held
that the ATS provides jurisdiction over (1) tort actions, (2) brought
by aliens (only), (3) for violations of the law of nations (also called
“customary international law”) including, as a general matter, war
crimes and crimes against humanity—crimes in which the
perpetrator can be called “hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind.”41

Prior to Filartiga, “the ATS was rarely invoked by
plaintiffs.”42 The “general view” was that the ATS only provided
power “to adjudicate violations of the law of nations as the term
was understood in 1789” and other violations for which Congress
34

See id.
Id.
Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction & Legal History
in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800, 06-4876).
37
Theophila, supra note 7, at 2864. The ATS was invoked twice shortly after
its passage. Id. at 2863-64 (“First, in Bolchos v. Darrel, the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina assumed that the ATS provided a supplemental basis for
jurisdiction over an admiralty suit for damages brought by a French privateer against
a mortgagee of a British slave ship. Furthermore, in 1795, Attorney General William
Bradford advised the State Department on whether American citizens who took part in
the destruction of a British slave colony could be subject to criminal liability. Although
Bradford expressed doubt regarding the citizens’ criminal culpability, he opined that a
federal court would be willing to entertain the foreign plaintiffs’ civil liability under the
ATS.” (footnotes omitted)).
38
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
39
Theophila, supra note 7, at 2864.
40
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
41
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 (footnote omitted) (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878).
42
HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 33, at 3.
35
36
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“specifically create[d] additional causes of action.”43 In Filartiga
however, the Second Circuit adopted a more “expansive”
interpretation of the ATS, one that provided “jurisdiction over
violations of international law in light of evolving jurisprudence.”44
C.

The Initial Surge and Early Litigation Under the ATS

Since Filartiga, plaintiffs have filed hundreds of
lawsuits claiming jurisdiction under the ATS.45 Initially, actions
were brought under the ATS against individuals.46 In the 1990s,
however, plaintiffs began bringing ATS suits against corporations
conducting business in developing nations.47 “[F]rom 1996 to [2002],
more than 100 ATS suits ha[d] been brought against American
companies in connection with nondomestic operations.”48 This surge
in litigation raised a number of concerns about the scope of the
ATS, particularly among large multinational corporations facing
potential liability.
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas K. Mitrokostas
envision a “nightmare scenario” in which “100,000 class action
Chinese plaintiffs” file suit against a collection of multinational
corporations “in a federal court for abetting China’s denial of
political rights, for observing China’s restrictions on trade
unions, and for impairing the Chinese environment.”49 The
authors surmise that the prospect of damages nearing $30 billion
would force corporations into enormous settlements, and that
corporations would “curtail their investments, not only in China
but also in other (mainly developing) countries with less than
perfect observance of individual and labor rights and
shortcomings in the realm of political and environmental norms.”50

43

Id. at 3-4 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 4.
45
See Lisa Ann T. Ruggiero et al., ATS Corporate Liability After Kiobel,
LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2011, 2:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/261968/ats-corporateliability-after-kiobel (“This seminal decision opened the floodgates for hundreds of
lawsuits claiming jurisdiction via the ATS over the past 30 years.”).
46
See Frank Cruz-Alvarez & Laura E. Wade, The Second Circuit Correctly
Interprets the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 111 (2011).
47
Ruggiero et al., supra note 45.
48
Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (Burmese
villagers filed suit in September 1997 against Unocal and their parent company, the
Union Oil Company of California, under the ATS. The suit was filed for alleged human
rights violations, including forced labor, in the construction of the Yadana gas pipeline
project in Myanmar).
49
HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 33, at 1.
50
Id.
44
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The ultimate effect, they explain, would be a chill on international
trade and the rise of a powerful anti-globalization force.51
While perhaps hyperbole, Hufbauer and Mitrokostas’s
“nightmare scenario” provides a helpful context for understanding
the issues courts face when applying the ATS. Courts are tasked
with providing adequate relief to plaintiffs without stymieing
international commerce or hindering international relations.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS

Amid the flurry of litigation, the Supreme Court
weighed in on the scope of the ATS for the first time in 2004.52
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court attempted to
significantly restrict the scope of ATS jurisdiction, but it
provided little guidance on the application of the law’s mandate.
The respondent, Alvarez, had brought a claim under the ATS for
arbitrary arrest and detention.53 Alvarez had been indicted in
the United States for torturing and murdering a Drug
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) officer.54 Unable to secure
Alvarez’s extradition, the DEA paid Jose Francisco Sosa, a
Mexican national, to kidnap Alvarez and to “bring him to the
United States for trial.”55
Once in the United States, Alvarez brought suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
claiming that he was illegally detained and his arrest by Sosa
constituted a violation of the law of nations because the
warrant only authorized his arrest in the United States.56 The
district court “awarded summary judgment and $25,000 in
damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim.”57 “A three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit then affirmed the ATS judgment,”58 and,
later, as they sat en banc to review, a divided court upheld the
decision.59 The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that
the ATS only provides a cause of action for violations of those
international norms “defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of . . . 18th-century paradigms.”60 The Court found
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 1-2.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
Id. at 698.
Id. at 697-98.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 725.
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that here, “a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed
by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law
so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.“61
Adopting the Filartiga ruling, the Court rejected Sosa’s
argument that the scope of international law violations cognizable
in ATS litigation was limited to those recognized in 1789.62 The
Court did, however, repeatedly emphasize the need for judicial
caution in recognizing any new cause of action under the law of
nations.63 The Court explained “that the door is still ajar subject
to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of
international norms today.”64 Ultimately, the Court concluded
that lower courts should “require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to [the modest number of violations
recognized at the time the ATS was enacted].”65 The Court
stated that its holding was consistent with the rulings of
previous courts that had addressed the issue. For example, the
Court highlighted the Filartiga court’s observation that, “for
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the
pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind.”66
The Court explained that “the determination whether a
norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should
(and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment
about the practical consequences of making that cause
available to litigants in federal courts.”67 In footnote twenty of
the opinion, the Court further posited that a “related
consideration is whether international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation
or individual.”68 These two passages of dictum, referencing
corporations only in a footnote, have been the focal points of
prolonged debate69 over whether the ATS extends liability to
61

62
63
64
65
66
67

68
69

Id. at 738.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 725-28.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 724-25.
Id. at 732 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).
Id. at 732-33 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 732 n.20.
See infra Part III.
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corporations even though the text of the statute is silent on
limits to the applicable class of defendants.
III.

THE COURTS STRUGGLE TO APPLY SOSA

Despite the Supreme Court’s strong caution for “vigilant
doorkeeping,” the lower courts’ inconsistent application of the
Sosa precedent evidences its inability to provide adequate
guidance. Some courts simply assumed sub silencio that
corporations were subject to liability under the ATS, while others
used a variety of principals from international law, domestic law,
or a combination of both.70 Conversely, courts denying corporate
liability under the ATS have consistently held that customary
international law does not recognize civil liability for
corporations and, thus, plaintiffs could not invoke jurisdiction
under the ATS in U.S. courts for claims against corporations.71
As a result, plaintiffs were left to pursue civil claims against
corporations only where the alleged human rights violations
occurred, often in developing countries.72
A.

The Calm Before the Storm—Courts Find Corporations
Can Be Held Liable under the ATS
1. Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd. (2007)

In Khulumani, foreign plaintiffs claimed that a group of
corporate defendants had “actively and willingly collaborated
with the government of South Africa” to sustain apartheid in
violation of international law.73 The district court “held that the
plaintiffs failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the
[ATS]” and dismissed the lawsuit.74 Expressing fear about the
potential chill on international commerce that holding corporations
liable under the ATS could instill, the district court found that
“customary international law” did not recognize causes of action for
the plaintiffs’ claims.75 On appeal, two of the three judges joined to
reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the ATS claim.76
70

Theophila, supra note 7, at 2880-81; infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
72
Ruggiero et al., supra note 45.
73
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007),
aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008).
74
Id. at 259.
75
In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v.
71
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The Second Circuit in Khulumani interpreted Sosa as
requiring a two-part inquiry.77 First, the court must determine
“whether jurisdiction lies under the [ATS],” which requires a
showing of a violation of the law of nations.78 The second
inquiry “is whether to recognize a common-law cause of action
to provide a remedy for the alleged violation of international
law.”79 Each of the judges expressed a different view on the
issue of corporate liability under the ATS pursuant to this test.
Judge Katzmann applied international law to both parts
of the inquiry. He first noted that, because the defendants did
not raise the issue, the court was not required to address the
question of whether corporations may be held liable for
violations of customary international law.80 However, Judge
Katzmann then observed that the Second Circuit has
“repeatedly treated the issue of whether corporations may be
held liable under the [ATS] as indistinguishable from the
question of whether private individuals may be.”81 This is
significant, because the Second Circuit already held in Kadic v.
Karadzic that “certain activities are of ‘universal concern’ and
therefore constitute violations of customary international law
not only when they are committed by state actors, but also when
they are committed by private individuals.”82 Further, while he
approved the district court’s use of international law for the
aiding and abetting analysis, Judge Katzmann nevertheless
disagreed with its conclusion that international law does not
recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting.83
Conversely, Judge Hall reached the same result, but
only applied international law to the first part of the inquiry
regarding “whether jurisdiction lies under the [ATS],” and
relied on federal common law to derive a standard for the
aiding and abetting cause of action.84 According to Judge Hall,
the standard for civil aiding and abetting should be derived

Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008), remanded sub nom. In re South African Apartheid
Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), motion to dismiss denied in part, No. 02
MDL 1499 (SAS), 2009 WL 3364035 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009).
76
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260.
77
Id. at 266 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 282-83.
81
Id. at 282.
82
Kadic v. Kardzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1996)).
83
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 268-69 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
84
See id. at 287-89 (Hall, J., concurring) (“I share Judge Katzmann’s
understanding . . . that . . . corporate actors are subject to liability under the [ATS].”).
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from section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
requires a mens rea of only of knowledge rather than purpose.85
In dissent, Judge Korman focused on corporate liability under
the ATS and found that international law does not recognize
corporate liability.86 Thus, the claims should be dismissed
under the first part of the inquiry for want of jurisdiction.87
2. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy
Inc. (2009)
In this case, a group of Sudanese plaintiffs filed suit
against Talisman Energy, Inc., claiming “that they [were]
victims of human rights abuses committed by the Government
of the Sudan” and that Talisman aided and abetted the
Sudanese Government in committing these abuses.88 In district
court, the plaintiffs claimed that Talisman violated customary
international law relating to genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.89 Surprisingly, the Second Circuit did not
discuss the substance of whether corporations can be held
liable under the ATS.90 In fact, the court openly stated:
We will . . . assume, without deciding, that corporations such as
Talisman may be held liable for the violations of customary
international law that plaintiffs allege. Because we hold that
plaintiffs’ claims fail on other grounds, we need not reach, in this
action, the question of ‘whether international law extends the scope
of liability’ to corporations.91

Instead, the court targeted the plaintiffs’ failure to meet their
burden of proof on their claim of accessorial liability. The court
officially adopted Circuit Judge Katzmann’s proposal in
Khulumani and applied international law, holding that “under
international law, a claimant must show that the defendant
provided substantial assistance with the purpose of facilitating
85

Id. at 287-89.
Id. at 326 (Korman, J., dissenting).
87
Id.
88
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247
(2d Cir. 2009).
89
See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. 453 F. Supp.
2d 633, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), judgment entered sub nom., No. 01-CV-9882-DLC, 2006
WL 3469542 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006), aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
90
It is worth noting that the Second Circuit had, in the past, decided ATS
cases involving corporations without addressing the issue of corporate liability. See,
e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 241 (2d Cir. 2003) Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000)
91
Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d at 261 n.12 (quoting Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
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the alleged offenses.”92 The court found that the plaintiffs did
not present evidence showing that Talisman purposely harmed
them and affirmed the district court’s dismissal.93
Illustrating the need to address the issue of corporate
liability under the ATS, when the Presbyterian Church of
Sudan filed a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, Talisman also filed a conditional cross-petition for a writ
of certiorari demanding that the Court first determine whether
federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS
in order to impose liability on corporations for violations of
customary international law.94 Despite the request for further
guidance, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and left the
issue unresolved.95
3. Romero v. Drummond Co. (2008)
In Romero v. Drummond Co., a Colombian labor union,
its leaders, and relatives of its deceased leaders brought an
ATS action in the Northern District of Alabama against the
mining company Drummond.96 The plaintiffs alleged that,
under the direction of corporate executives in the United States,
the company “hired paramilitaries affiliated with the United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia to torture” and assassinate union
leaders.97 On appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants
argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the ATS did not allow suits against corporations.98
The court supported its ruling that the ATS granted
subject matter jurisdiction on two grounds.99 First, the court felt
bound by its decision in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A., Inc.,100 which simply assumed that a corporate entity could
be held liable without any discussion of the issue.101 Second, the
court noted that the text of the ATS “provides no express
exception for corporations.”102 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
92

Id. at 247, 258.
Id. at 247-48.
94
See Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010) (No. 09-1262).
95
Talisman Energy, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 79 (mem.).
96
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008).
97
Id. at 1308-09.
98
Id. at 1315.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250
(11th Cir. 2005).
102
Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (citation omitted).
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established corporate liability under the ATS and relied only on
the court’s silence in past cases and the text of the statute
without performing any substantive analysis of customary
international law. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently cited
Romero in Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., to find that “corporate
defendants are subject to liability under the ATS and may be
liable for violations of the law of nations,”103 thus solidifying
corporate liability under the ATS in the Eleventh Circuit.
B.

Changing Tides—Courts Find Corporations Cannot Be
Held Liable Under the ATS

Until 2010, not a single Circuit excused corporations
from civil liability for violations of the law of nations under the
ATS.104 In September 2010, however, three courts precluded
“plaintiffs from asserting an ATS claim against any corporation
within their jurisdictions.”105 These cases represented a sea
change in the evolution of ATS litigation, and compelled
subsequent courts finding in favor of ATS-based corporate
liability to defend and propound their positions.
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2010)
In Kiobel, Nigerian residents claimed that oil
corporations “aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
committing [human rights abuses].”106 Oil exploration and
production companies had been operating in Nigeria and
causing environmental damages since 1958.107 In response, local
residents organized an opposition movement.108 The plaintiffs
alleged that in 1993 some of these corporations obtained aid
from the Nigerian government to quell the civilian opposition.109
In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that for two years the
Nigerian military:

103

Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing
Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315), abrogated by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct.
1702 (2012).
104
Theophila, supra note7, at 2892.
105
Id. (the Second Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.)
106
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
107
Id. at 123.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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[S]hot and killed Ogoni residents and attacked Ogoni villages—
beating, raping, and arresting residents and destroying or looting
property—with the assistance of defendants. Specifically, the
plaintiffs allege that defendants, inter alia, (1) provided
transportation to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to be
utilized as a staging ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers
involved in the attacks, and (4) provided compensation to those
soldiers.110

Despite the apparent connection between the defendant, Royal
Dutch Petroleum, and the serious allegations, the Second
Circuit held that suits for violations of “the law of nations”
under the ATS could not be initiated against corporations
under the ATS.111 Following the directions of Sosa footnote
twenty to consider the type of defendant, “[t]he Kiobel court
held that because corporate liability is not a universal and
well-defined norm of international law, federal courts do not
have subject matter jurisdiction over corporations pursuant to
the ATS.”112 In short, the Second Circuit “eliminated the most
common type of ATS cases.”113
The majority in Kiobel applied only international law to
the analysis of “whether corporations can be subject to liability”
under the ATS.114 Accordingly, the court “consider[ed] . . . the
sources of international law [to] reveal . . . that those sources
lead inescapably to the conclusion that the customary
international law of human rights has not to date recognized
liability for corporations that violate its norms.”115 Relying on
the guidance for “authoritative . . . sources of international law
identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice,”116 the majority focused on the following three bodies
of law to determine that international law does not recognize
corporate liability: (1) international tribunals, (2) international
treaties, and (3) works of scholars.117
First, in analyzing law from international tribunals, the
court stated at the outset “that no international tribunal of
which [it was] aware ha[d] ever held a corporation liable for a
violation of the law of nations.”118 The court’s discussion began
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id. at 120.
Ruggiero et al., supra note 45 (emphasis added).
Id.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 125.
Id.
Id. at 132.
See id. at 132, 137, 145.
Id. at 132.
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with an analysis of the Nuremberg Tribunal,119 which it
considered “the single most important source of modern
customary international law concerning liability for violations
of fundamental human rights.”120 The court explained “that the
London Charter, which established the [Nuremberg Tribunal],
granted . . . jurisdiction over natural persons only.”121 The court
based this finding on language from the London Charter
“granting the tribunal jurisdiction to try and punish
person . . . whether as individuals or as members of organizations
. . . .”122 The court further noted that although the London Charter
“granted the International Military Tribunal the authority to
declare organizations ‘criminal,’” and, indeed, both the SS and
the Gestapo were later indicted, the actual purpose “of
declaring an organization criminal was merely to facilitate the
prosecution of individuals who were members of the
organization.”123 Lastly, the court observed that the Nuremberg
Tribunal charged “[t]wenty-four executives of [IG] Farben,” a
corporate entity intimately involved with the actions
operations of the Nazi party, but did not charge or indict the
corporation itself.124 The court found this history of the
Nuremberg Tribunal to indicate that international law does not
recognize corporate liability.125 Further, international tribunals
since Nuremberg, such as the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court,
also limited jurisdiction to “natural persons.”126 Based on these
findings, the Second Circuit found that past international
tribunals’ treatment of corporate liability failed to establish
that corporate civil liability is a recognized norm of customary
international law.127
Second, the court’s analysis of international treaties focused
largely on rebutting the findings by the district court in Talisman
119

The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military tribunals for the
prosecution of political, military, and economic leaders of Nazi Germany. The trials
were held in Nuremburg, Germany by the allied forces of World War II. See STEPHAN
LANDSMAN, CRIMES OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE LAW CONFRONTS HARD CASES (2005).
120
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132-33.
121
Id. at 133.
122
Id. at 133-34 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (quoting Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (the
London Charter) art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 288).
123
Id. at 134.
124
Id. at 134-35.
125
Id. at 143-46.
126
Id. at 136.
127
Id. at 137.

2013]

SUBSTANCE OVER FORM

1569

that the recognition of corporate liability in a vast number of
treaties supports similar recognition by the law of nations.128 The
majority rejected the finding, noting that although many “treaties
suggest a trend towards imposing corporate liability in some
special contexts, no trend is detectable outside such narrow
applications in specialized treaties, and there is nothing to
demonstrate that corporate liability has yet been recognized as a
norm of the customary international law of human rights.”129
Third, the majority examined scholarly work about
corporate liability.130 It found that “most proponents of corporate
liability under customary international law discuss the subject
as merely a possibility or a goal, rather than an established
norm of customary international law.”131 In sum, the majority
did not find any basis in international law to recognize
corporate civil liability for human rights violations.
2. The Kiobel Line of Jurisprudence
Although Kiobel was the first Circuit Court decision to
expressly reject corporate liability under the ATS, both the
Central District of California and the Southern District of
Indiana almost simultaneously refused to extend civil liability
to corporations in Doe v. Nestle, S.A.132 and Viera v. Eli Lilly &
Co.,133 respectively. Further, the Second Circuit followed its
Kiobel decision several months later with Liu Bo Shan v. China
Construction Bank Corp., where it applied Kiobel as precedent,
thus signifying a commitment to its earlier ruling.134
In Doe v. Nestle, S.A., Malian plaintiffs brought claims
under the ATS, alleging that several international corporations
aided and abetted their forced labor in cocoa fields in Cote
D’Ivoire.135 The court dismissed the claim, finding that
corporations are not subject to ATS liability and that “the
extent that corporations should be liable . . . is a matter best
left for Congress to decide.”136 In Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
Brazilian residents filed a complaint against “six U.S.
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 138.
Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 144 n.48.
748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1126-28 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
No. 1:09-CV-0495-RLY-DML, 2010 WL 3893791, at *2-4 (S.D. Ind. Sept.

30, 2010).
134
135
136

Liu Bo Shan v. China Constr. Bank, 421 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2011).
Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d. at 1064.
Id. at 1144.
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corporations . . .[,] claiming to have suffered injury as a result
of localized environmental pollution emanating from
manufacturing sites located in [two Brazilian cities].”137 The
court applied Kiobel’s reasoning and dismissed the ATS claims.138
Similarly, Liu Bo Shan v. China Construction Bank Corp.
involved an appeal by a former employee of the defendant
corporation who claimed that the defendant fabricated charges
against him after he released the results of a damaging audit
report. The plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the fictitious
charges, Chinese police tortured, beat, sexually assaulted, and
arbitrarily detained him for a prolonged period of time.
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found itself bound to the
Kiobel precedent.139 These cases signified, at least initially, a
broad acceptance of the Kiobel reasoning.
IV.

A NEW LINE OF JURISPRUDENCE EMERGES SUGGESTING
KIOBEL WAS WRONGLY DECIDED

Although Kiobel may have snuffed ATS corporate
liability in the Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit subsequently sided with the
Eleventh Circuit, each finding that a corporation can be subject
to liability under the ATS.140 Confronted by the Second Circuit’s
bold opposition, the circuit courts in this line of jurisprudence
bolstered the analysis in support of corporate liability under
the ATS, which was rather haphazardly assumed pre-Kiobel. In
particular, the alternative line of ATS jurisprudence recast preexisting interpretations of both Sosa and international law to
show that the Second Circuit wrongly decided Kiobel. Despite
the widening circuit split, the Supreme Court did not seize the
opportunity to intervene on the issue of corporate liability
under the ATS and ruled instead on other grounds.

137

Viera, 2010 WL 3893791, at *1.
Id. (finding the Second Circuit’s reasoning “persuasive”).
139
Liu Bo Shan, 421 F. App’x at 90-92.
140
Moreover, in Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., the Fourth Circuit heard oral argument
on May 12, 2011 in which the plaintiffs alleged that an American chemical
manufacturer sold a chemical used to manufacture mustard gas that was used by the
Iraqi government forces against the Kurds living in northern Iraq. 658 F.3d 388, 390
(4th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit rendered its decision on September 19, 2011,
finding “that the ATS imposes liability for aiding and abetting violations . . . but only if
the attendant conduct is purposeful.” Id. However, the panel declined to consider the
issue of corporate liability because plaintiffs “failed to plead facts sufficient to support
the intent element of their ATS claims.” Id.
138
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Judge Leval’s Kiobel Concurrence

Although Judge Leval concurred with the Kiobel
judgment, his lengthy analysis functions predominately as a
dissent.141 Noting that “[t]he majority opinion deals a substantial
blow to international law and its undertaking to protect
fundamental human rights,”142 Judge Leval opined that
corporations could be held liable for violations of the law of
nations, but dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to
state a legally cognizable claim.143 His concurrence provides a
thorough critique of the majority opinion that has resonated in
subsequent Circuit decisions.144 His opinion focuses on three
points: (1) the majority’s ruling leads to illogical results in
opposition to the objectives of international law, (2) the
majority opinion fails to show that international law does not
recognize civil liability for corporations, and (3) Sosa footnote
twenty supports a finding for corporate liability under the ATS.
1. Illogical Results in Opposition to the Objectives of
International Law
Judge Leval dissected the practical effect of the
majority’s rule.145 The rule only provides relief for victims of a
narrow class of atrocities “against the corporation’s employees,
natural persons who acted in the corporation’s behalf, but not
against the corporation that commanded the atrocities and
earned profits by committing them.”146 As a result, corporations
earning profits while committing human rights abuses are “free to
retain those profits without liability.”147 Under the majority’s rule,
he found that “[s]o long as they incorporate, . . . businesses will now
be free to trade in or exploit slaves, employ mercenary armies to do
dirty work for despots, perform genocides or operate torture prisons
for a despot’s political opponents, or engage in piracy—all without
civil liability to victims.”148 He concluded that such a “free pass to

141

See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149-96 (2d Cir.
2010) (Leval, J., concurring), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
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Id. at 149.
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Id. at 153.
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See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 646 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th
Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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act in contravention of international law’s norms . . . conflicts with
the humanitarian objectives of that body of law.”149
2. No Proof that International Law Does Not Recognize
Civil Liability for Corporations
Judge Leval contended that the majority’s reliance on
international tribunals to determine the reach of international
law was misplaced.150 He noted that “international tribunals
that have been established to date with jurisdiction over
private persons have concerned themselves only with criminal
punishment.”151 He demonstrated “the fallacy of the majority’s
argument that the restriction of criminal punishments for
violations of the law of nations to natural persons reflects an
intention in international law to immunize juridical entities
form civil compensatory liability”152 by highlighting the
differences in criminal and civil law.153
An “indispensable element to the justification of
criminal punishment is criminal intent,” and thus, because a
juridical entity cannot form such intent, “it is an anomaly to
view a corporation as criminal.”154 Further, “criminal
punishment does not achieve its principal objectives when it is
imposed on” a corporation as opposed to a natural person.155 For
example, criminal punishment seeks to inflict “punitive
suffering” on the criminal in order to: (1) “give society the
satisfaction of retribution,” (2) “disable the offender from
further criminal conduct during imprisonment,” (3) “change a
criminal’s conduct” by arousing a sense of “repentance,” and (4)
“dissuade others . . . from criminal conduct.”156 Because a
corporation has no soul, the benefits obtained from suffering
are unavailing and imprisonment is clearly not an option.157
Accordingly, the only punishment available is a monetary
penalty that would tax the corporation’s owners, creditors, or
149

Id. at 155.
Id. at 163.
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Id. (emphasis added).
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Id. (emphasis added).
153
Id. at 166 (“The reasons why the jurisdiction of international criminal
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customers, but would “fail to hurt the persons who were
responsible for the corporation’s misdeeds.”158 Thus, inflicting
criminal punishment on a corporation accomplishes no penal
objective.159 Conversely, “[a] principal objective of civil tort liability
is to compensate victims of illegal conduct for the harms inflicted
on them . . . .”160 Further, “[b]ecause the corporation, and not its
personnel, earned the principal profits from the violation of the
rights of others,” the corporation is the suitable entity to
compensate those victims.161
Further, international law provides the norms of
conduct and prohibits certain acts such as genocide, torture,
slavery and war crimes, but allows each state to make its own
determination concerning civil liability.162 The ATS is the
United States’ mechanism to enforce violations of international
law through the imposition of civil liability.163
3. Sosa Footnote Twenty Supports a Finding for
Corporate Liability
In contrast with the majority opinion, Judge Leval’s
concurrence finds that footnote twenty of Justice Souter’s
opinion in Sosa supports corporate liability rather than
eliminates it.164 In considering “whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued,” the majority’s interpretation
suggests that courts should distinguish between natural persons
who can be civilly liable and corporations who cannot.165 Judge
Leval alternatively concluded that a contextual reading reveals
“the passage [to] mean[] the contrary.”166 Footnote twenty refers
to concerns, raised in the Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic167
158

Id.
Id.
160
Id. at 169.
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Id. Judge Leval also notes “unlike the case with corporate criminal
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to impose civil liability on corporations.” Id.
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Id. at 172-73 (“While international institutions have occasionally been
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basic position of international law with respect to civil liability is that States may impose
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Id. at 175.
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Id. at 163-64.
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Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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and Kadic v. Kardzic168 opinions, that certain conduct constitutes
violations of the law of nations only when done independently of
a State, “while other noxious conduct violates the law of nations
regardless of whether done by a State or a private actor.”169 The
appropriate distinction is between private and state action
rather than distinctions among private actors, such as
corporations and individuals.170
B.

Three Circuit Courts Find in Favor of Corporate
Liability under the ATS

Soon after the Second Circuit ruling in Kiobel was
released, three circuit courts found in favor of corporate
liability under the ATS. These opinions build upon arguments
identified in Judge Leval’s Kiobel concurrence and justify the
position that the Second Circuit was an outlier. In particular,
the circuit courts upholding corporate liability under the ATS
focus on the distinction between international law’s norms of
conduct and the states’ enforcement of civil liability.
International law identifies which acts are prohibited—e.g.,
genocide, slavery, war crimes, and piracy—while remedial
actions are left up to the individual states—e.g., civil liability
through the ATS for the United States.
First, the D.C. Circuit found in favor of corporate
liability in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., where Indonesian
villagers alleged that members of the Indonesian military,
hired by Exxon Mobil to guard a natural gas facility, committed
“human rights abuses . . . includ[ing] genocide, extrajudicial
killing, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual violence, and
kidnaping.”171 The court “recogniz[ed] that corporate liability
differs fundamentally from the conduct-governing norms at issue
in Sosa, and consequently customary international law does not

168

Kadic v. Kardzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1996)
Id. at 165.
170
Id. (“Far from implying that natural persons and corporations are treated
differently for purposes of civil liability under ATS, the intended inference of the
footnote is that they are treated identically. If the violated norm is one that
international law applies only against States, then ‘a private actor, such as a
corporation or an individual,’ who acts independently of a State, can have no liability
for a violation of the law of nations because there has been no violation of the law of
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norms of international law regardless of whether done by a State or a private actor,
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nations and is subject to liability in a suit under the ATS.”).
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provide the rule of decision.”172 Judge Rogers, writing for the
majority, explained that Sosa provides that customary
international law should inform the substantive causes of action
in ATS cases. “[F]ederal courts,” however, “must determine the
nature of any remedy in lawsuits alleging violations of the law of
nations by reference to federal common law . . . .”173
Next, the Seventh Circuit harped on the distinction
between norms of conduct and enforcement in order to hold
corporations liable under the ATS. In Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co., twenty-three Liberian children charged
Firestone with utilizing “hazardous child labor” on a rubber
plantation in Liberia in contravention of customary international
law.174 Although the court ultimately dismissed the claim on
grounds that the asserted child labor did not violate customary
international law, the court indicated that corporations could be
held liable under the ATS.175 Analogous to the D.C. Circuit
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit “underscore[d] the distinction
between a principle of law, which is a matter of substance, and
the means of enforcing it, which is a matter of procedure or
remedy. . . . International law imposes substantive obligations
and the individual nations decide how to enforce them.”176
Lastly, seven out of the eleven Ninth Circuit judges
sided with Judge Leval’s concurrence in Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, which was a suit brought against the Rio Tinto mining
company for its alleged role in genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and racial discrimination against residents
of the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea.177 Again, the
majority homed in on the distinction between the customary
norms identified by international law and the enforcement
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Id. at 41.
Id. at 41-42 (“That the ATS provides federal jurisdiction where the conduct
at issue fits a norm qualifying under Sosa implies that for purposes of affording a
remedy, if any, the law of the United States and not the law of nations must provide
the rule of decision in an ATS lawsuit.”). The court also noted “[o]ur conclusion differs
from that of the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., because its
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be found in federal common law at issue here; even on its own terms, its analysis
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through civil actions provided by domestic law.178 Thus, the
clear distinction between norms and enforcement proved to be
a compelling argument.
C.

The Supreme Court Abstains from Weighing In

Confronted by the lower courts’ inconsistent rulings
concerning corporate liability under the ATS, the Supreme
Court granted cert in Kiobel to settle the issue.179
Unfortunately, the Court found ground to rule elsewhere and
decidedly left the issue open.180 Pursuant to a canon of statutory
interpretation called the “presumption against extraterritorial
application,” the Court held that the ATS did not confer subject
matter jurisdiction in this case, and thus eliminated the
petitioners’ access to U.S. courts.181
The presumption against extraterritorial application
“provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.’”182 The Court found
that “nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption” and
because “all relevant conduct took place outside the United
States,” the petitioners could not pursue their claim.183 The
Court noted that “even where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the Unites States, they must do so with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”184 The Court, however, did not define “sufficient
force.”185 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the narrow holding in
Kiobel where the petitioner, respondent, and all relevant
conduct were foreign and thus the opinion left open “a number
of significant questions.”186 He explained that where a lawsuit’s
key elements bear a closer U.S. nexus, “proper implementation
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Id. at 748; see also id. at 770 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“Domestic law
therefore governs how international norms are enforced under the ATS.”).
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(emphasis added).
186
Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of the presumption against extraterritorial application may
require some further elaboration and explanation.”187
In contrast, Justice Breyer agreed with the holding
because the allegations in Kiobel “lack[ed] sufficient ties” to the
United States, but disagreed with applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality.188 Justice Breyer found that the ATS
could apply where:
(1) the alleged conduct occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is
an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially
and adversely affects an important American national interest, and
that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.189

Although not directly addressing the issue of corporate
liability, Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, indicated that
“[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”190
Given that the term “presence” was not defined, it is likely that
plaintiffs “domiciled or headquartered in the United States
remain fair game in ATS suits, even if those suits challenge
purely extraterritorial conduct by the corporations or their
subsidiaries.”191 Should a court find that being domiciled or
headquartered in the U.S. has “sufficient force” to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality, a determination of
corporate liability under the ATS would be necessary.
V.

CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE SECOND
CIRCUIT RULED INCORRECTLY

The three consecutive findings in favor of corporate
liability under the ATS by circuit courts—all of which reiterated
a consistent doctrinal approach supported by law, logic, and
policy—suggest that the Second Circuit’s ruling in Kiobel was
an outlier. The Second Circuit misinterpreted precedent and
defied the objectives of international law in order to support an
unsubstantiated policy agenda that insulates corporations from
liability. The rationale espoused by Judge Leval’s Kiobel
187

Id.
Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
189
Id.
190
Id. at 1669 (majority opinion). One might argue that this language represents
an implicit acknowledgment of corporate liability under the ATS by the Court.
191
Myles, supra note 24 (emphasis added).
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concurrence, and adopted and enhanced by the subsequent
Circuit Courts, recognized the flawed analysis lingering in the
Second Circuit.
A.

The Kiobel Majority Opinion Begs for Review

At the outset, two early passages in the Kiobel majority
opinion reveal Judge Cabranes’s ulterior motives and his own
reservations about the decision. First, Judge Cabranes
describes a muddled jurisprudential environment, one backed
by strong economic incentives to soften the blow of his decision:
Such civil lawsuits, alleging heinous crimes condemned by
customary international law, often involve a variety of issues unique
to ATS litigation, not least the fact that the events took place abroad
and in troubled or chaotic circumstances. The resulting complexity
and uncertainty—combined with the fact that juries hearing ATS
claims are capable of awarding multibillion-dollar verdicts—has led
many defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial. Thus, our Court
has published only nine significant decisions on the ATS since 1980
(seven of the nine coming in the last decade), and the Supreme Court
in its entire history has decided only one ATS case.192

The combination of “complexity and uncertainty” with the
threat of large settlements is not a reason to create precedent
that defies the objectives of international law and that
promotes corporate profit over the ability of victims of human
rights abuses to obtain redress. Further, Judge Cabranes closes
his introduction, stating, “we are confident that if our effort is
misguided, higher judicial authority is available to tell us so.”193
Such words suggest a court that is begging for review by the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not
take advantage of its opportunity to tell the Second Circuit that
its “effort [was] misguided.”194
B.

Misapplication of International Law

The essence of the majority opinion in Kiobel is that
Sosa’s footnote twenty commands lower courts to make a
determination as to whether the type of defendant—individual,
corporation, or state—can be liable for violations of international
law.195 Then, by looking at sources of international law, the
192
193
194
195

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 123.
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128.
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majority instructs lower courts to see if liability for that type of
defendant has become a specific, universal, and obligatory
norm of international law.196 In espousing such a construct, the
majority opinion incorrectly focuses on the form of the
defendant rather than the substance of the violation. As a
result, it misinterprets binding precedent and establishes a
framework that is misaligned with the goals of international
law. Further, the Kiobel majority fails to pass its own test,
drawing erroneous conclusions from incorrect sources.
1. Incorrect Focus on the Form of the Defendant Rather
than the Substance of the Violation
In Sosa, the Supreme Court assumed that the First
Congress’s intent in enacting the ATS was to provide redress for
conduct “threatening serious consequences in international
affairs”197—e.g., infringements of ambassadorial rights and
piracy.198 The Court’s application of this standard to AlvarezMachain’s claim emphasized the substance of the conduct rather
than the form of the perpetrator. The Court focused on whether
“a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the
transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment . . .” violated customary international law,199 thereby
centering the crux of its debate on what type of conduct fit within
the class so heinous as to be protected by the law of nations.
Looking towards the end of Sosa footnote twenty, which
considers “whether international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation
or individual,”200 the Court “compare[s] Tel-Oren (insufficient
consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates
international law), with Kadic (sufficient consensus in 1995
that genocide by private actors violates international law).”201
This citation suggests that Sosa’s footnote twenty does not
stand for the proposition that corporations are not liable for
violations of international law. Rather, it simply implies that a
finding of an international law violation is dependent upon the
actor—when committed by a state actor as opposed to a non-state
196
197
198
199
200
201

See supra Part III.B.1.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
See id.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 732 n.20.
Id. (citations omitted).
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actor, “such as a corporation or individual.”202 The Court
emphasized the distinction between “private,” non-state actors,
and “public,” state actors. And, as argued in a Kiobel amicus brief,
“certain egregious conduct violates international human rights
standards, whether committed by State or non-State actors.”203
The Second Circuit Kiobel majority opinion exhibited a
“[f]ailure [t]o [u]nderstand ‘[n]orms’ as ‘[s]tandards of
[c]onduct.’”204 The majority incorrectly asked whether it was a
“norm” for corporations to be prosecuted for violations of human
rights.205 This reasoning, however, misses the point that certain
types of conduct, such as genocide, torture, and slavery, fall
within a class of activity so heinous that it is proscribed by
international law.
By misinterpreting footnote twenty and placing an
emphasis on the form of the defendant, the majority’s efforts were
misguided. In an attempt to determine whether international law
recognizes civil liability for corporations at all, the majority asks
the wrong questions and gets the wrong answers206 because
it is wrong to conclude from the alleged absence of human rights
cases against corporations that they are exempt from human rights
norms. International law never defines the means of its domestic
implementation, leaving sovereign States a wide berth in assuring
that the law is respected and enforced in accordance with its own
law and traditions.207

Highlighting the flaw in this line of reasoning, Judge Posner
makes the point in Flomo:
If a plaintiff had to show that civil liability for such violations was
itself a norm of international law, no claims under the Alien Tort

202

Id.
Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners
at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter International
Law Scholars Brief].
204
Theophila, supra note 7, at 2902.
205
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
206
See International Law Scholars Brief, supra note 203, at 2-3 (“The majority
below reached its conclusion only by looking for the wrong kinds of evidence of
international law, inferring from the absence of cases imposing corporate civil liability
for human rights violations that no norm imposes or allows such liability. That
technique betrays a basic misunderstanding of international law and this Court’s
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain . . . . The Kiobel court’s methodological error has
substantive consequences and leads the panel to miss the consistent principles of
international law that recognize corporate liability and the obligation of States to
provide a meaningful remedy for all violations of human rights, no matter who or what
violates them.” (citation omitted)).
207
Id. at 4-5.
203
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Statue could ever be successful, even claims against individuals; only
the United States, as far as we know, has a statute that provides a
civil remedy for violations of customary international law.208

International law focuses on determining what conduct violates
the law of nations.
That international criminal tribunals such as the one at
Nuremberg were given the authority to adjudicate and enforce
penalties for criminal conduct does not mean that civil remedies
for the same conduct do not, or should not, exist. With the ATS,
“the First Congress of the United States exercised the sovereign
discretion protected by international law by empowering the
federal courts to hear aliens’ civil actions for those violations of
international law that take tortious form . . . without specifying
the types of defendants who might be sued.”209
2. Erroneous Conclusions Drawn From Incorrect
Sources
“Although . . . international criminal tribunals distinguish
between natural and juristic persons for purpose of criminal
liability . . . , [n]othing in international law . . . precludes the
imposition of civil or tort liability for corporate misconduct . . . .”210
As Judge Leval made abundantly clear, there are numerous
reasons why corporations are not charged with criminal
liability.211 Thus, it is improper to draw the conclusion from the
lack of available criminal charges that corporations are not
similarly subject to civil charges. Ambassador David J. Scheffer
further explained the absence of liability for corporations with his
observations regarding the legislative history of the Rome Statute
which established the International Criminal Court. During the
drafting of the law, negotiators: 1) intentionally excluded
corporations from criminal liability for practical considerations
208

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011)
International Law Scholars Brief, supra note 203, at 6 (emphasis added);
see also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History William R. Casto et al. in
Support of Petitioners at 8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (No. 10-1491) (“The
text of the ATS reflects congressional intent to provide aliens a civil remedy for
violations of the law of nations. The ATS restricts the jurisdiction to causes arising
under ‘the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’ where the plaintiff is ‘an
alien.’ While the text of the ATS specifies what conduct comes within its reach
(violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States), it expressly does not
limit suits against any class of defendant, including corporations. Had Congress
intended to exempt particular defendants from ATS suits, it would have done so
explicitly.” (citations omitted)).
210
International Law Scholars Brief, supra note 203, at 7-8.
211
See supra Part IV.A.2.
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having nothing to do with customary international law, and 2)
deliberately avoided the issue of civil liability for tort actions by
multinational corporations because civil claims were beyond the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.212
The Court in Sosa recognized that the ATS relies on the
juxtaposition of international law and domestic common law.
International law defines customary norms of regulated conduct,
while domestic common law governs enforcement of tort
remedy.213 The First Congress must have expected domestic
common law to govern secondary matters in order to give the
statute practical effect “because internationally constituted
tribunals did not exist when the ATS was adopted.”214
International law is used to establish substantive norms and
domestic law provides the remedy for their violation.215
By misinterpreting the meaning of Sosa footnote twenty,
the Second Circuit Kiobel majority “conflate[s] the jurisdictional
and cause of action aspects of an ATS suit.”216 In civil actions
under the ATS: the ATS provides subject matter jurisdiction, the
law of nations (or treaty law) determines the substantive norms,
and domestic federal common law provides the cause of action.217
Once the federal courts are provided with jurisdiction via a breach
212

Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University School of
Law at 2-3, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel,
(No. 10-1491) (“The negotiators’ decision . . . to exclude corporations had nothing to do
with customary international law and everything to do with a complex and diverse
application of criminal (as opposed to civil) liability for corporate conduct in domestic
legal systems around the globe. Given that diversity, it was neither possible to
negotiate a new standard of criminal liability with universal application in the time
frame permitted . . . , nor plausible to foresee implementation . . . when confronted with
such differences in criminal liability for juridical persons. Additionally, the
negotiations . . . steered clear of civil liability for tort actions by multinational
corporations because civil liability falls outside of the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court. Thus, no conclusion can be drawn . . . that would preclude national
courts from holding corporations liable in civil damages for torts committed on national
or foreign territory.”).
213
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (“The jurisdictional
grant [the ATS established] is best read as having been enacted on the understanding
that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”).
214
Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History Barbara Aronstein Black
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 12, Kiobel, (No. 10-1491).
215
See Andre Nollkaemper, Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts,
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 795 (2007) (“Since international law determines only general
principles, leaves much of the detail of the fashioning of relief to the domestic level, and
relies on domestic law to supplement it with necessary detail and to adjust it to the
domestic context, different states will inevitably come up with different responses.”).
216
Odette Murray et al., Exaggerated Rumours of the Death of an Alien Tort?
Corporations, Human Rights and the Remarkable Case of Kiobel, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L.
57, 75 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
217
Id.
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of a customary norm as defined by international law, the issue of
corporate liability is governed by domestic federal common law. It
would be naive to expect international law to define universally
accepted rules on “standards of proof, rules of evidence, theories of
vicarious liability and doctrines of veil piercing, agency, respondeat
superior, proof of causation and calculation of damages.”218
International law leaves such causes of action to the domestic law
of each state.219 The issue of corporate liability is not a norm of
conduct, but rather a method of allocating losses to corporate
principals for agents’ torts and is thus governed by domestic
federal common law.220 It should come as no surprise that U.S.
federal common law has a longstanding tradition of holding
corporations civilly liable.221 Therefore, it is only proper that
corporations are likewise liable under the ATS.
C.

Denial of Corporate ATS Liability Feels Wrong

If states and private persons can be found liable for
violating the law of nations, why should corporations be exempt?
A failure to hold corporations accountable for their actions not
only defies logic, but also undermines the effectiveness of
international law in achieving its goals.
Judge Weinstein best summarized the argument on
principles of fairness and logic in In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation, a case brought by Vietnamese nationals
against U.S.-based corporations that provided the U.S.
government with the Agent Orange that was sprayed over
Vietnam from 1961 to 1975.222 Judge Weinstein wrote:
Limiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the
corporation directing the individual’s action through its complex
operations and changing personnel makes little sense in today’s
world. Our vital private activities are conducted primarily under
corporate auspices, only corporations have the wherewithal to
respond to massive toxic tort suits, and changing personnel means
that those individuals who acted on behalf of the corporation and for

218

Id. at 78-79.
Id.
220
Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History Barbara Aronstein Black
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2-3, Kiobel, (No. 10-1491).
221
See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States Supporting Petitioners at 25,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1491).
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Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig.), 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Vietnam Ass’n for Victims
of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
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its profit are often gone or deceased before they or the corporation
can be brought to justice.223

The notion that corporations are not subject to the same
liability as people are under the ATS is particularly perplexing
in light of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in
which the Supreme Court held that corporations have the same
First Amendment right to fund political speech as natural
persons.224 One would think that with rights come responsibilities.
The Second Circuit majority in Kiobel provides no
compelling reason for abandoning a fundamental goal of
international law: to provide the protections for citizens around the
world from heinous atrocities.225 The majority opinion alludes to the
fact that corporations face potential liability for large settlements
or court sanctioned damages,226 but it fails to elaborate on any type
of economic catastrophe that could possibly warrant a denial of
human rights protections, if one is even possible. In Flomo, Judge
Posner makes the valid point that “[b]usinesses in countries that
have and enforce laws against child labor are hurt by competition
from businesses that employ child labor in countries in which
employing children is condoned.”227 If bona fide businesses are
adversely affected with or without civil liability from the ATS, a
decision based on policy considerations should support a system
that provides the greatest protections for human rights under
international law.
In addition, there are two protections that mitigate
against the “nightmare scenario” offered by Hufbauer and
Mitrokostas.228 First, Sosa already provides “that the door is
still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a
narrow class of international norms today.”229 Thus, by “vigilant
doorkeeping,” the courts are instructed to limit conduct that
gives rise to jurisdiction under the ATS. Sosa explains that this
process requires “an element of judgment about the practical
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the
federal courts.” Under the current framework, it is possible for
223

Id. at 58 (citation omitted).
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43 (2010).
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 154-55 (2d Cir.
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courts to limit the type of conduct giving rise to jurisdiction under
the ATS on policy considerations without completely eliminating
civil liability for corporations. Second, while the standard is not yet
settled, a stringent requirement for aiding and abetting can
significantly limit the scope of corporate liability. For example,
Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in Khulumani concluded that
aiding and abetting requires a mens rea of purpose and an actus
reus of “substantial assistance.”230 Thus, corporations conducting
bona fide operations in high-risk nations would be protected from
frivolous lawsuits. Only if their actions and intent show a clear
connection to the human rights abuses would they be subject to
civil liability under the ATS. There is ample room for the law to
protect international commerce and human rights simultaneously.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel derailed a long
history in our nation’s court system protecting victims of human
rights violations. The Court based its decision on a misapplication
of international law in support of unsubstantiated policy
considerations. It misinterpreted Sosa to instruct lower courts to
determine whether international law recognizes liability for the
form of the defendant rather than the substance of the conduct,
and defied the objectives of international law in doing so. Further,
the Kiobel decision fails because the court reaches its conclusion
through an investigation of international criminal law, which
sheds little if any light on the issue of civil liability. The Supreme
Court’s refusal to settle the issue of corporate liability under the
ATS is unfortunate. But, to the extent future ATS cases are
brought against corporations, courts should follow the line of
jurisprudence coming out of the circuit court decisions issued
subsequent to Kiobel that largely adopt Judge Leval’s concurrence.
Mark Nixdorf
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